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May 17, 2004 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.' This precise day
also marked the sixty-first anniversary of the Supreme Court's first
use of the phrase "private attorney general."2 For about three decades
after this initial 1943 appearance, the private attorney general
concept surfaced only occasionally in the legal literature. Starting in
the 1970s, however, its presence became quite regular, and that
regularity has escalated steadily to the present: on average, during
the past fifteen years, every single workday, somewhere in the United
States, some judge has written a legal opinion or some scholar has
penned an article invoking the private attorney general concept. 3
That the phrase is employed so frequently suggests its utility
as a concept. What is odd, though, is that when probed, the concept
proves surprisingly mercurial. 4 The phrase is sometimes used to refer
to plaintiffs, 5 occasionally used to refer to defendants, 6 and typically
used to refer to lawyers. 7 (What other concept is so malleable that it
can be deployed to signify either a plaintiff or a defendant, a lawyer or
a client?) Legislatures create private attorneys general by statute, but
before they did and when they have not, courts have created them by
judicial decision, and executive agencies by fiat.8 Congress creates
private attorneys general, but so do state legislatures, state courts,
and state administrative agencies. 9 The phrase is an integral part of
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Justice Douglas used the term in a dissenting opinion, citing to Judge Jerome Frank's
original use of the phrase in a Second Circuit decision rendered several months earlier. F.C.C. v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Assoc.
Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.)).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 194-95 (1998) (stating that "[iut is revealing that there is still no legal
definition, nor any well-established pattern of usage, which precisely identifies a litigant as a
'private attorney general.' ").
5. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 251
(1988).
7. See, e.g., Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 370
(1988); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Modeling Class Counsel, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1397, 1403-06 (2003).
8. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 247-61 (1975)
(providing a historical overview of the creation of private attorneys general).
9. See generally, Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine - State
Cases, 106 A.L.R. 5th 523, 523 (2004).
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the doctrine of standing ° and of the rules concerning attorneys' fees.11
In its single most important decision about private attorneys general,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution
necessarily restrains the concept, while simultaneously implying that
courts of equity nonetheless retain inherent powers to propagate it.12
If there is any fixed star in this constellation, it is that the
private attorney general is a placeholder for any person who mixes
private and public features in the adjudicative arena. Yet even that
compass point proves elusive, as there are so many players who mix
public and private functions in so many different ways that the
concept holds the place for a motley cast of disparate characters.
"Anyone," one commentator argues, "can call himself a 'private
attorney general.' "13 While scholars and judges have often stated that
the private attorney general performs a mix of public and private
functions, they have much less frequently attended to the variety of
different public-private mixes contained within this rubric.14
My goal in this Article is to map these mixes-to distill from
the singular private attorney general concept a range of distinct
private attorneys general-and then to convince the reader that this
new taxonomy is a helpful heuristic device. I take as the template for
the logic of my argument Alfred Kinsey's taxonomy of sexual
orientations, an analogy that may be distant in content but is
nonetheless similar in form.15 Kinsey, a taxonomist by training, 16
rebelled against society's insistence that human sexuality occurred in
but two diametrically opposed forms: heterosexual and homosexual. 17
10. See Assoc. Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
11. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263.
12. Compare id. at 262 ("[I]t is apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys' fees
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters
for Congress to determine."), and id. at 270 ("[Ilt is not for us to invade the legislature's province
by redistributing litigation costs."), with id. at 258-59 (noting circumstances in which federal
courts enjoy "inherent power" to "allow attorneys' fees in particular situations").
13. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 194. Given this picture, it is easy to embrace Professor
Hazard's conclusion, reached in the context of modeling class action counsel, that the "private
attorney general" term "is unhelpful at best, and on balance adds to... confusion." Hazard,
supra note 7, at 1399.
14. On the rare occasions that scholars closely examine the concept, they generally sort
private attorneys general in two categories, distinguishing the public interest advocate from the
entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyer. See infra note 36.
15. ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610 (1948) [hereinafter
KINSEY, MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR]; ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 446 (1953).
16. On Kinsey's intellectual development, see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Of Wasps and WASPs,
in THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 155, 155 (1985).
17. Kinsey explained his philosophy in these words:
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Kinsey demonstrated that nature did not deliver human sexuality in
two pure forms, but rather in a spectrum of mixes ranging from the
purely heterosexual to the purely homosexual.18
Lawyering, I will argue, is like sex. There are not just two pure
forms--the private attorney on the one hand and the government
attorney on the other-but rather an array of mixes of the public and
private. After some preliminary comments about the history of the
private attorney general concept (Part II), I situate along a spectrum
the various different attorneys invariably referred to in the literature
as private attorneys general, showing the particular ways each mixes
public and private functions (Part III).
This new taxonomy sheds light on current anxieties about the
legitimacy of class action lawyers. Part IV demonstrates this by
exploring the ramifications of a somewhat exemplary and very timely
case: the current California antitrust class action against the
Microsoft Corporation. Private attorneys general purporting to
represent fourteen million California consumers settled these
consumers' antitrust claims for $1.1 billion in, essentially, $20
vouchers; however, if the full amount of vouchers are not
redeemed-and how could they be?-two-thirds of the residuary value
will be distributed as vouchers to underprivileged schools throughout
the state. This so-called "cy pres" voucher settlement triggers a
central concern about class action attorneys, namely, that they serve
their own interests and not those of their clients. Law and economics
scholars have sustained this critique for several decades now,
demonstrating that the private attorney general framework presents a
classic "agency" dilemma. In Part IV, I contend that a subtler
understanding of the public/private mixes in the private attorney
general concept suggests a new response to this critique. I do not
argue that the critique is baseless. I argue that it insufficiently
attends to the nuances of what it means to be a private attorney
general. Once the various types of private attorneys general are
illuminated, it becomes clearer that the class action attorney is an
agent for various principals, depending upon where she happens to
fall along this spectrum, and hence that the agency problems are more
multifaceted then conventionally described. In making this argument,
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The
world is not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things
white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete
categories. Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into
separated pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its
aspects.
KINSEY, MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 15, at 639.
18. Id. at 639-59.
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I therefore demonstrate the usefulness of the spectral typology I
develop here.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCEPT
Private attorney general is an awkward expression, qualifying
the public lawyer, the attorney general, with the contradictory
appellation, private. Before relishing that curiosity, however, it is
worth appreciating the oddity of the public phrase itself. Attorney
general appears to introduce a military metaphor into the lawyering
literature. And in fact, solicitors general and attorneys general are
often referred to as if they commanded large armies--"General
Ashcroft," for example. 19 Yet the military metaphor is not only
limited-there are only attorneys general, not attorneys corporal,
sergeant, and lieutenant, working their way up the ladder to become
attorneys colonel-it is actually inapposite. What puts the "general"
in "attorney general" is not strength but scope: "general" defines the
ambit of the "power of attorney" given to the lawyer in question,
distinguishing, since the fifteenth century, lawyers with general
powers of attorney from those with particular or specific
appointments. 20 The public attorney general, to apply the concept, has
a general, not limited or specific, power of appointment from the
people.21
While the attorney general concept carries this lineage, its
counterpart, the private attorney general, made its first appearance in
the legal literature in a 1943 decision by Judge Jerome Frank for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.22 In that time period,
19. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-client Privilege in the Wake of
September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2003) (stating that "General Ashcroft
announced his interim amendment to Bureau of Prisons regulations, which took effect five days
later, without the usual public comment period"); Gene R. Nichol, Ashcroft Wants Even More,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 20, 2003, at A15, available at 2003 WL 3446867 (noting that "what
marks General Ashcroft's dream statute, beyond its extravagant grab for power, is the extent to
which Patriot II reflects an executive branch determination to go it alone, unilaterally");
Nicholas von Hoffman, Are You Afraid of the Cops? You May Have Good Reason to Worry About
the Bad Ones, WASH. POST, May 21, 1995, at Ci (referring to Janet Reno as "General Reno").
20. The Oxford English Dictionary reports that:
The designation began in England, where this officer was at first merely the king's
attorney, called from the reign of Edward IV, the "king's general attorney," to
distinguish him from those appointed to act on special occasions, or in particular
courts. The descriptive designation seems to have grown into a title during the 16th c.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com.
21. See id. (describing an attorney general as "[a] legal representative or deputy acting
under a general commission or 'power' of attorney, and representing his principal in all legal
matters: opposed to attorney special or particular").
22. Assoc. Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
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courts were working out the jurisdictional issues triggered by
Congress' expansion of the administrative state during the New
Deal.23 The issues posed in Frank's case were paradigmatic: who,
exactly, did Congress mean to empower when in the Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 it authorized "any person aggrieved by an order issued by
the [Bituminous Coal Commission] in a proceeding to which such
person is a party 24 to seek review in a United States Court of
Appeals-and how did the Constitution constrain such an
authorization? In the decision's key passage, Judge Frank concluded
that Congress could authorize a private citizen to file suit even if the
sole purpose of the case were to vindicate the public interest as
opposed to some private interest of the litigant: "Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals."25 And thus
the concept was hatched-sort of.
The practice of private lawyers supplementing the enforcement
of public laws was hardly novel, 26 and the practice of labeling such
persons "private attorneys general" not uncontested. Two years prior
to Judge Frank's decision for the Second Circuit, Judge Edgerton, of
the D.C. Circuit, commenting on a similar type of litigant, stated,
"[H]e appears only as a kind of King's proctor, to vindicate the public
interest."27  In 1943, when Justice Douglas brought the private
attorney general phrase into a Supreme Court decision for the first
time, he mentioned the King's proctor locution in the same breath.28 If
the concept were likely to catch on in the United States, it was
unlikely to do so as a King's proctor, so it is not surprising to find that
styling soon retired. 29
23. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992).
24. Ickes, 134 F.2d at 699 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A § 836(b)).
25. Id. at 704 (citation omitted). In drawing this conclusion, Judge Frank analogized this
citizen suit to a qui tam action, Id. at 704-705 (discussing U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537 (1942)).
26. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 290-303 (1989) (describing a variety of ways in which
private citizens assisted in the enforcement of criminal laws throughout American history,
including pre-False Claims Act qui tam actions).
27. Colorado Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 118 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Edgerton, J.,
concurring).
28. F.C.C. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Only one contemporaneous opinion applies the King's proctor title to the private
attorney general before the phrase disappears from the legal literature. Stark v. Wickard, 136
F.2d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1943). The phrase was popular throughout the nineteenth century,
especially in matrimonial cases where it referenced English legal provisions enabling a King's
proctor to represent the interests of the Crown in divorce proceedings. The phrase is used in this
sense in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 359 n.2 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), then it
disappears completely from American case law.
[Vol. 57:6:21292134
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What seems more surprising is the slow expansion of the
private attorney general concept. The phrase appears but seven times
in the legal literature of the 1940s, only another eleven times in the
1950s, and but seventy times during the entire 1960s. 30 Finally, in
the 1970s, use of the phrase skyrockets:31 it appears 759 times in
those ten years and its use increases steadily each decade to the
present. 32 There are two explanations for the limited early use of the
phrase. First, the private attorney general concept, when introduced,
was resisted by New Deal jurists who considered these so-called
litigants mere rent-seekers challenging the new administrative
state.33 The typical early private attorney general was a losing
licensee or a consortium of corporations unhappy with New Deal rate-
setting; Justices Frankfurter and Douglas scorned the prospect of
giving special status to these interests via the private attorney general
concept-Justice Douglas's initial use of the phrase came in a dissent
in which he (concurring with a similar assessment reached in a
companion dissent by Justice Frankfurter) objected to the notion and
30. See infra note 32.
31. See Rabkin, supra note 4, at 179 ("The 'private attorney general' came out of the
shadows in the 1970s").
32. Professor Rabkin reports that the private attorney general wilts after its flowering in
the 1970s, appearing 'less often in case reports." Id. at 180. In fact, judges' use of the phrase in
case decisions continued to escalate during the 1980s and 1990s, though that increase was not as
dramatic as the more than tenfold increase between the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars were about a
decade behind, using the phrase more than ten times as often during the 1980s as during the
1970s. All of this data is taken from a Westlaw search I conducted on July 26, 2004, for "private
attorney! general" in various databases. In the "JLR" database, the phrase occurs 3,035 times.
In the "ALLCASES" and "ALLCASES-OLD" databases, the phrase occurs in legal opinions 3,424
times:
CASE LAW LAW REVIEWS TOTAL PER WORKDAY
(assuming 250/yr)
1940s 7 0 7 .003
1950s 7 4 11 .004
1960s 56 14 70 .03
1970s 705 54 759 .30
1980s 949 605 1,554 .62
1990s 1,035 1,488 2,523 1.01
2000-July 2004 665 870 1,535 1.34
TOTAL 3,424 3,035 6,459 .4
33. Professor Sunstein explains that Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter were "the principal
early architects of what we now consider standing limits" and that "It]heir goal was to insulate
progressive and New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack." Sunstein, supra note 23, at
179.
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called for its use to be limited.34 A second reason that the private
attorney general phrase was rarely used before the 1970s is that it
existed solely as a matter of party status. As such, it was never
destined to blossom into a household word. Even in the 1960s and
1970s, when judges used the phrase more frequently as party status
doctrines were expanded by public law litigation,35 these changes
contributed to only minor increases in the phrase's appearance. The
phrase explodes in the 1970s not because of public law litigation but
because it takes root in new attorney's fees statutes and doctrines.
Once loosed as a matter of money, the private attorney general
concept's diffusion was limited only by the imagination of lawyers
seeking attorneys' fees.
Hence the present state of affairs: the widespread use of the
phrase in a multitude of different situations, to refer to a plethora of
discrete actors, carrying on a range of diverse functions-a muddle
with but one common denominator: the mix of public and private
features. Can this mess be organized? The primary attempts to do so
to date have focused on the singular distinction between the
ideological plaintiffs' attorney and the fees-driven plaintiffs'
attorney.36 Professor Coffee introduced this distinction in his seminal
work on plaintiffs' attorneys (which I discuss in detail below). 37 For
Professor Coffee, who brought a novel law and economics perspective
to the field, the distinction is important because it is speaks to the
incentives that drive the two types of private attorneys general. The
distinction caught on, though, because it also makes good sense: the
NAACP attorney, paid a small salary for her intense efforts, is
34. See id. at 264-266 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 319
U.S. 239, 248-264 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
35. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1289-1304 (1976); Stephen C. Yeazell, Commentary, Intervention and the Idea of
Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles Schools Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 257 (1977).
36. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing The Private Attorney General: Why The Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 235-36 (1983); Garth, et al.,
supra note 7, at 356-57; Hazard, supra note 7, at 1398. Professor Redish takes this dualism
(idealistic vs. self-interested) and subdivides the self-interested between those private attorneys
general seeking client compensation and those (he alleges) who seek only the bounty of their fee,
resulting in three categories. Martin H. Redish, Class Action and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 71, 90-
93. Professor Erichson does not attempt a grouping, but he describes several discrete examples
of current situations in which the public and private functions of attorneys are mixed. Howard
M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public
and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 2-23 (2000). Professor Fisch
also does not sort private attorneys general into categories, but uses the qui tam case as a lens
through which to view to public/private mixes in class action cases. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action
Reform, Qui Tam, and The Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167-70 (1997).
37. See infra notes 76-81, 116-123 and accompanying text.
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generally driven by different incentives than those that motivate the
plaintiffs' attorney subsisting on the fees she can draw from her
portfolio of class action lawsuits. What's more, as Professor Coffee has
demonstrated over the past quarter century, focusing on attorney
incentives explains a lot about what cases get filed, how they are
handled, and whether and how they settle. This organizing
distinction helps explain a lot of things, a lot of the time-but not
everything and not always.
It is not, then, the only way to organize the field. Bisecting the
field according to plaintiff attorney incentives is a helpful way of
describing why attorneys do what they do. Standing alone, though,
this organization does not get at why the legal system enables private
attorneys general in the first place and what it is we hope to get out of
them. This bisection is a powerful way of thinking about means, but
perhaps a less direct way of examining ends. In what follows, I
propose a different dissection of the field that has value apart from the
descriptive value of the prevalent incentive-based organizing method.
III. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN THE LAWYERING LITERATURE
My claim that the private attorney general mixes aspects of
public and private lawyering rests upon an assumption that there are,
at least, these two pure forms of lawyering. Although the integrity of
the forms does not hold up well upon close observation, 3 there are
certain features commonly labeled as "public" and certain features
commonly labeled as "private" in the lawyering literature that are
useful starting points.3 9 A simple case like the toxic environmental
harm alleged in the book A Civil Action40 suggests the two archetypes:
first, an action for compensatory damages brought on behalf of
harmed individuals by private attorneys, and second, a prosecution for
civil penalties brought on behalf of the government by a public
38. See Fisch, supra note 36, at 184 ("Although various efforts have been made to draw
principled distinctions between private and public litigation in terms of objectives or remedies,
such distinctions break down both as a historical matter and in modern litigation practice");
Hazard, supra note 7, at 1403 ("[T]here is no general proposition, standard, or uniform concept of
a public attorney general").
39. My colleague Jody Freeman has noted the utility of employing the "public" and "private"
constructs at the very moment one is arguing that most, if not all, activities are a mix of the two.
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000)
(concluding that "while we might talk in terms of "public" and "private" actors, the reader should
not conclude that there is such a thing as a purely private or purely public realm.").




attorney general. These archetypes highlight three characteristic
features of the public/private divide-the lawyer's client, the lawyer's
reward, and the lawyer's goal.41
A. Individual/Government Clients
The simplest distinction between the public and private lawyer
is that the former represents the government and the latter
represents some nongovernmental actor. On the private side of the
spectrum, it is typical that a single client hires a single lawyer, or law
firm, creating an agency arrangement between the principal/client
and agent/lawyer. 42 The lawyer then pursues the client's individual
interests, with a clear ethical duty of loyalty to those interests. The
private arrangement can get far more complicated, particularly when
the private client is a corporation or association and the task of
identifying the client's interests is thereby complicated. But at least
this much is true: in private lawyering, the client's interests are
nongovernmental, nonpublic interests.
By contrast, an attorney is a public attorney if her client is the
government. The intangible client with amorphous interests,
marginal to private lawyering, is the core of public lawyering. What is
complicated on this side of the spectrum is not only identifying what
constitutes the client/government's interests, but also identifying the
public official or group to label as the immediate client.43 Often public
lawyers work for a government agency, which acts as their client.
Many public attorneys also, or alternatively, consider "the public" or
"the public interest" as their real client in interest; the agency or
government official to whom they report is simply an intermediary
form of that principal. 44 But at least this much is true: in public
lawyering, the client's interests are governmental and public in
nature. 45
41. See Erichson, supra note 36, at 3-4.
42. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1401 (stating that "the client in the ordinary client-lawyer
relationship is the principal and the lawyer the agent, with a corresponding allocation of
authority") (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 2, introductory note
(2000)).
43. See Erichson, supra note 36, at 24.
44. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 820 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING] ("Who is the client of the
government lawyer? Possible contenders include the agency head, the chief executive officer
(e.g., the governor or president), the legislature as the elected representatives of the public and
the 'public' "); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.9.2, at 449-51 (Government
Lawyer Models and Roles).
45. See 7 Am. JUR. 2D Attorney General § 23 (2004) ("Absent statutory amplification of the
attorney general's authority, he or she can participate in litigation of a private character only
[Vol. 57:6:21292138
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The fit is not perfect, of course. Some private attorneys-for
instance, those that solicit victims of mass torts as clients through
mass advertising-often have an attenuated connection to their
clients; they might be more likely to think of them as an amorphous
group of harmed persons with generalizable claims.46 Conversely,
government attorneys occasionally have what look more like
individual clients with rather specific and seemingly private needs,
such as when a government lawyer defends a particular government
official in a Section 1983 case.47 Nonetheless, it is a widely-utilized
trope that private attorneys represent individual clients with private
interests while public attorneys represent the citizenry at large
pursuing their public interest. Private attorneys are ordinarily agents
of their individual clients while public attorneys are ordinarily agents
of some public good.
B. Fees/Salary
The nature of the lawyer's relationship to her client determines
the fee structure within which she labors. Private attorneys work for
individual clients and those clients pay them for their services. 48 Their
pay may take the form of a flat fee, an hourly wage, or of a cut of the
proceeds of the lawsuit, but regardless of its nature, its source will be
the client's purse. By contrast, public attorneys work for the public
and are paid a salary to do so. The amount of time they invest in an
issue, the amount of sanction they recover, or the amount of harm
they deter, has no bearing on their fee. Their priorities, the uses of
their billable hours, are generally determined by politics, not money.
The fit is once again not perfect. Private attorneys can recoup
their costs from the losing side, or from the public treasury, in certain
types of cases or situations. Private legal services lawyers are paid a
salary consisting largely of public funds. Public interest lawyers also
tend to work for a fixed salary (though typically not one paid by
government grants). Conversely, public attorneys may actually
directly benefit from their lawsuit if, for instance, their agency is
permitted to retain the proceeds of their efforts. Nonetheless, it is a
widely-utilized trope that private attorneys are paid a fee reflective of
when it has a bearing on the interests of the general public or affects the interests and welfare of
the general public. Thus, the attorney general may not be appointed by a court to represent a
private plaintiff suing for violation of civil rights.") (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within The Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 312-13 (1996) (describing some mass tort
lawyers as "wholesalers").
47. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING, supra note 44, at 835-36.
48. Fisch, supra note 36, at 171.
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their time or effort while public attorneys are paid a salary
irrespective of the scope or success of particular prosecutions.
C. Compensation/Deterrence Goals
The most beguiling aspect of characterizing lawyers as public
or private in nature comes in relation to the type of work each tends to
do. The conventional story is that compensation is a private goal and
deterrence a public one: private attorneys pursue compensation for
individual clients arising out of past injuries (torts, breaches of
contracts, discriminatory harms, financial losses) while public
attorneys aim to deter future bad behavior. 49 This accepted wisdom
allows for exceptions: compensatory damages, especially punitive
damages, collected by the private attorney surely deter some bad
behavior and, conversely, government actions may compensate for
past wrongs. Indeed, private attorneys occasionally bring purely
deterrent lawsuits (seeking injunctions against future behavior), while
government attorneys occasionally bring purely compensatory
lawsuits (seeking civil penalties for historic harms).
The exceptions to the conventional story begin to expose its
shortcomings: in reality, both public and private lawyers pursue both
deterrence and compensation. Compensation may be the core of
private lawyering, but deterrence is far from a marginal activity. In
the words of my colleague Steve Yeazell, "private litigants for a
millennium have sought prospective, specific remedies: replevin and
ejectment were probably the two most commonly used remedies for
800 years, as long as land and livestock were major components of the
economy. '' 50 Similarly, deterrence may be the core of public lawyering,
but compensation is far from a marginal activity. Government
lawyers regularly pursue compensation, recoupment cases being
among the most numerous types of case filed by the government.
Notwithstanding the shortcoming in the conventional account,
the deterrence/compensation distinction nonetheless retains some
power in distinguishing public from private lawyering. Governments
tend to do essentially two things: (1) govern by law, and (2) do
business by money, contracts, loans, etc. The Supreme Court has
49. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686-87 (1941) (stating that administrative agencies tend to
regulate by "outlining a very detailed plan for future conduct," but that "it is important to note
than an administrative body does not normally act to remedy wrongs which have occurred").
50. Email from Steven Yeazell, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, to William B.
Rubenstein, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (July 30, 2004, 10:41 AM) (on file with
author).
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come to call the second category, in many circumstances, "market
participation," and in those spheres the law often treats the
government as a more private than public actor.51 As applied to
lawyering, when the government pursues compensatory damages, it is
typically seeking to be made whole for losses it has suffered in its
more proprietary, not law-enforcement, functions. Thus, recoupment
cases seek to get back loans paid to citizens who have defaulted;
damage cases seek to remedy fraud wrought against the treasury or,
for instance, to recover the costs of paying too much for computers
equipped with Microsoft software. 52  By contrast, when the
government is involved in deterrent matters, it is usually doing those
things that are more exclusive to governments, more generally
recognized as "public"-prosecuting criminals, enforcing regulatory
regimes, and so on. The converse is true as well: though private
lawyers pursue both compensation and deterrence, when they pursue
deterrence, we tend to categorize such actions as the more public
aspects of private lawyering.
In short, even though both public and private lawyers pursue
both deterrence and compensation, there remains some nontrivial
residual sense in which deterrence is a public goal and compensation a
more private one. This may be a consequence of the combination of
several of the factors I have outlined here, namely a conjunction of the
scope of the client with the nature of the remedy.5 3 Deterrence feels
51. The phrase arises most often in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, where the Court has
held that if a state is acting as a market participant, not as sovereign, it may prefer the goods or
services of its citizens, even though to do so as market regulator would violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. E.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-15
(1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 434-47 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 802-10 (1976). The Court rejected application of a similar distinction in the field of
state sovereign immunity, College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 675-87 (1999), thereby providing a wider umbrella of immunity to the states. The
distinction is not limited to constitutional law: for example, the Court recently employed it in
considering whether certain Postal Service activities constituted a violation of the antitrust laws.
See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 747 (2004) (holding that the Postal
Service's "public characteristics and responsibilities indicate it should be treated under the
antitrust laws as part of the Government of the United States, not a market participant separate
from it").
52. Professor Erichson discusses some recent high profile instances of government
compensatory suits, including tobacco cases and handgun litigation. Erichson, supra note 36, at
18-21. While the government has sought damages in such instances, it is important to note that
the theory of these cases sought recoupment of the government's own damages (for example,
state medical assistance spent on tobacco-related illnesses), not the damages suffered by its
citizens. These government plaintiffs are acting as any harmed market participant would. What
they are not doing is acting as a government, i.e., suing on behalf of their citizens on a parens
patriae theory to recoup the citizens' damages. These government recoupment cases therefore
fall on the more private side of governance.
53. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 319.
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public when it applies broadly to enjoin future activity, because then it
operates somewhat like law itself. Compensation seems private
because it is almost invariably realized individually. The point is not
that public lawyers pursue only deterrence and private lawyers only
compensation. The point is that when anyone pursues a deterrent
remedy, particularly one with wide application, it feels as if they are
doing something public, while when anyone pursues compensation, it
feels as if they are doing something private.
D. Mapping The Public/Private Distinction as Spectrum Endpoints
Together, these three features-clients, fees, and goals-
provide the conventional benchmarks for the public/private
distinction in the lawyering literature. As I am reconceptualizing the
terrain here, they instead provide the endpoints of the spectrum of
public and private mixes:
1 2 3 4 5
PRIVATE PUBLIC





Having established those endpoints, we can now map some of
the mixes.
III. THREE FORMS OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The private attorney general concept is deployed in the legal
literature in at least three distinct ways, each of which presents a
different mix of the public and private features of lawyering: (1) some
private attorneys general substitute for the public attorney general; (2)
some private attorneys general supplement the public attorney
general; and (3) some private attorneys general simulate an attorney




A. The Private Attorney General as Substitute Attorney General
Some attorneys literally perform the exact functions of the
attorney general's office though they themselves are not attorneys
general. These attorney general "substitutions" occur in at least three
forms. First, occasionally the attorney general will hire a private
attorney to do the work of her office. Two recent high profile instances
of this practice occurred when in the Microsoft antitrust trial, Deputy
Attorney General Joel Klein hired David Boies to try the United
States' case against Microsoft, and in the tobacco litigation, when
state attorneys general hired plaintiffs' counsel on a contingent fee
basis to recoup state governments' monetary losses attributable to
smoking. 4 The practice is hardly novel: in Brown v. Board of
Education, the state of South Carolina hired John W. Davis, "the most
accomplished and admired appellate lawyer in America," and "turned
the case over to Davis without any strings attached."55  Special
prosecutor laws accomplish a similar result-the replacement of a
government attorney by a private lawyer-but through a different
process (appointment by a panel of judges after referral by the
Attorney General) and for a different reason (outsiders may be able to
more fairly, not just more competently, prosecute government
officials).56  In these instances, public officials privatize their
functions, hiring private attorneys to perform as attorneys general,
thereby creating, in essence, private attorneys general.
A similar privatization can occur not when the attorney general
delegates her function to the private sector but rather when the client
-a public official-hires a private lawyer to represent him in his
official capacity. In California, for example, public interest lawyers
mounted a statewide class action challenging the conditions in public
schools throughout the state. Former Governor Gray Davis was a
named defendant in the lawsuit. Rather than rely on the state's
attorney general to represent him, Davis farmed the work out to one of
the state's largest law firms. 57
54. See Erichson, supra note 36, at 17-18, 35-40 (discussing these examples and the risks
involved in such arrangements).
55. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 543 (1975).
56. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §49, 591-99 (2004).
57. California law enables state agencies to contract personally for legal services, at the
state's expense, when "a conflict of interest on the part of the Attorney General's office prevents
it from representing the agency without compromising its position." CAL. CODE § 19130(b)(7)
(West 2004). Governor Davis and the Attorney General did not agree on whether a conflict
existed in this case, but the Governor nonetheless retained private counsel. See Nanette Asimov
& Lance Williams, Gov. Davis vs. Schoolkids: High-priced Legal Team Browbeats Youths About
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A third form of attorney general substitution comes through
the qui tam action. In the qui tam case, private attorneys bring
claims on behalf of the government. 58 The qui tam lawyer is not hired
by the attorney general or other executive department official.
Rather, she is a self-appointed bounty hunter, pursuing government
fraud where the government has not done so.59 The qui tam lawyer
must provide notice to the attorney general and can be replaced by the
attorney general's office (thereby demonstrating that it is the attorney
general's work she is proposing to do).60 If the attorney general
chooses not to take over the qui tam action, however, the private
attorney substitutes for him.61 Her fee is then taken from her bounty,
and she is authorized to keep a portion of the proceeds as well. 62
Shoddy Schools, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 3413085
(stating that Governor Davis retained the firm against the advice of the state's attorney general
and that the firm charges $325/hour for attorney work, $140/hour for paralegals); see also
Nanette Asimov, Bitter Battle Over Class Standards: State Spends Millions to Defeat Students'
Suit, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 5, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 3754421 (noting that
"[Governor] Davis has paid $13 million in public funds to the Los Angeles law firm of O'Melveny
& Myers to fight the students"). The ACLU Foundation of Southern California represented the
plaintiffs in this matter. Id. I sat on one of the organization's Boards of Directors.
58. The meaning of qui tam is captured by the full Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur - who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as
well as his own. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (1999).
Qui tam cases in the United States have raised a host of constitutional questions including ones
about whether the government or the qui tam relator is the real party in interest, in other words,
whether the case is properly characterized as public or private in nature. See Gretchen L.
Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining The Rights and Roles of the Government and the Relator
Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357, 1367-74 (1998).
59. See, e.g., False Claims Act [hereinafter FCA], 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). Under the
FCA, a private person may bring a qui tam civil action "in the name of the [federal]
Government," id. § 3730(b)(1), against "any person" who "knowingly presents ... [to the]
Government... a false of fraudulent claim for payment ...." Id. § 3729(a),
60. The FCA, for example, provides the Attorney General a sixty-day window in which to
intervene and assume primary responsibility for the qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2),
(b)(4), (c). The government enters roughly one in four qui tam matters. Forney, supra note 58,
at 1359 (citing JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QuI TAM ACTIONS: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 140 (1996)).
61. The relator nonetheless cannot dismiss the action without the consent of the Attorney
General and court. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The extent of the Attorney General's authority to
block a settlement has, not surprisingly, been hotly debated in the courts. Forney, supra note 58,
at 1374-90. This is not surprising because the issue yet again poses the central question of
whether these are public or private lawsuits.
62. E.g., FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(d)(2). These can range anywhere from 15.25 percent
if the government intervenes and from 25-30 percent if it does not. Id. The Supreme Court has
held that the qui tam relator has a private interest independent of the government's public
interest by virtue of the fact that she may remain in the action if replaced by the Attorney
General and, even when replaced, is entitled to a portion of the bounty. Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at
772. This holding underscores the peculiar mix of public and private presented by the qui tam
action. See Fisch, supra note 36, at 195 (concluding that "[r]ather than attempting to choose
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The qui tam relator substitutes for the attorney general, but
only in what is arguably the most "private" of government functions:
the recoupment of compensatory damages. 63  Outside this
compensatory realm, the law generally does not permit private
lawyers to appoint themselves substitute attorneys general, for
instance, to enforce civil or criminal sanctions. 64 Indeed, this stakes
out an important boundary on the private attorney general spectrum,
a boundary policed by the doctrine of "standing" in the federal courts:
the Supreme Court's insistence that a private plaintiff demonstrate
injury-in-fact limits Congress's ability to appoint private attorneys
general whose only interest is the general one of enforcing the law.
For example, as I discuss below, environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs
must show their own personal interest in a matter prior to filing suit
in federal courts. This places them among supplemental attorneys
general-those who enforce public policy by pursuing their own
interests. The qui tam relator feels quite close to this-she assists
with the public policy of deterring fraud on the government by
pursuing her own interest-but I place her on the substitute side of
the line for two reasons: first, she more literally represents the
government than the private plaintiffs with their own compensatory
claims across the boundary; second, she is seen as having standing
derivative of the government's standing, an assignee of the
government's interests, unlike the supplemental attorney general.
In sum, the most common examples of substitute attorneys
general come from areas among the least common in government
lawyering. With the exception of the firm hired to defend the
government official when the attorney general is alleged to have a
between public and private enforcement in terms of their relative effectiveness, qui tam attempts
to coordinate the contributions of both systems").
63. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the qui tam action is essentially a form by
which the government partially assigns its claims for damages to private parties. Vt. Agency,
529 U.S. at 773 & n.4; see also id. at 788 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree
with the Court that the qui tam relator is properly regarded as an assignee of a portion of the
Government's claim for money damages"). In the Vermont Agency case, the Court also
acknowledged that the harm to the government in qui tam cases can consist as well of "injury to
its sovereignty arising from violations of its law," id. at 771, but the Court simultaneously stated
that this type of public injury "suffices to support a criminal lawsuit by the Government," id.,
hence distinguishing the private qui tam case from the public criminal prosecution.
64. Jill Fisch has discussed using the qui tam suit as a model for reforming class actions.
Id. In one aspect of this discussion, she identifies the possibility of Congress authorizing a
relator to not just do the government's (private) job of recouping its losses but to do the
government's (public) job of enforcing the law. Id. Professor Fisch identifies the standing
problems this would present. Id. These problems are theoretically vitiated by the current
practice of interposing an injured party client as a class representative. Id. at 188. I label and
categorize these lawyers "supplemental attorneys general" and discuss them in the following
section. See infra Part III.B.
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conflict, the other familiar substitute attorneys general-those
pursuing money damages in the Microsoft or tobacco cases and
compensatory damages in qui tam matters-perform functions more
familiarly labeled private.6 5 They are also likely to be compensated
not by a government salary, but rather with a private market-like fee
or bounty. The substitute attorney general is a first step on the
spectrum away from the purely public side; she is removed not only
because she is a private attorney substituting for a public one, but also
because she tends to perform more private-like functions than those
that constitute the core of the attorney general's work.
B. The Private Attorney General as Supplemental Law Enforcer
Lawyers who occasionally stand in for the public attorney
general are not the only attorneys dubbed private attorneys general.
The literature more commonly employs the label to describe private
attorneys whose work for private clients contributes to the public
interest by supplementing the government's enforcement of laws and
public policies. 66 There are several versions of the supplemental
private attorney general. The clearest and narrowest form is the
private attorney general who earns her post through a specific
delegation by Congress or a state legislature. In the environmental
field, for example, Congress has included provisions in most of its
statutes for citizen suits; these provisions authorize nongovernmental
attorneys to enforce environmental standards if the government has
not done so. 6 7 As just discussed above, this places the citizen-suit
65. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
66. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine - State Cases, 106
A.L.R. 5th 523 ("The private attorney general doctrine rests upon the recognition that privately
initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies
embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions and that, without some mechanism
authorizing the award of attorneys fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies
will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.") (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5;
People ex rel. Dep't of Conservation v. El Dorado County, 108 Cal. App. 4th 672 (3d Dist. 2003)),
67. Professor Thompson reports that "[elvery major environmental law passed since 1970
now includes a citizen suit provision (with the anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act)." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of
Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192. See also Beverly McQueary Smith, Recent
Developments in Citizens' Suits Under Selected Federal Environmental Statutes, in
ENVIORNMENTAL LITIGATION 701, 708-09 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Feb. 15, 1995), WL
C981 ALI-ABA 701 (providing a list of laws that include citizen suit provisions). That citizen
suits are precluded if the government has itself pursued enforcement, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(b)(1)(B), make these citizen suit advocates seem more like substitute attorneys general, such as
qui tam relators, who fill in for government lawyers. Thompson, supra, at 196-97 (stating that
citizen suit provisions were heavily influenced by qui tam actions). And the two categories do
bleed into one another. Nonetheless, there are several key distinctions. Qui tam cases seek
compensatory damages and qui tam attorneys are bounty hunters funded by their catch; most
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plaintiff at the boundary closest to the substitute attorney general: if
Congress authorizes her to do the government's work, she is being
created to substitute for the government lawyer. Supreme Court
doctrine, however, limits the plaintiffs appearance in court to those
instances in which she can show she pursues her own injury in fact.
This makes her a supplemental attorney general because she comes to
enforce law by pursuing her own interests. To be clear though, her
interest may be quite modest compared to the breadth of the statutory
provision she derivatively enforces. She is but one small step away
from the substitute attorney general, a step that is necessitated by
standing doctrine, but the size of the step can be measured by the
relatively minute scope of her individual interest.
At the other side of the spectrum are private lawyers whose
clients have significant individual interests but who incidentally
further some public policy through their litigation activities. At the
extreme, commentators occasionally argue that any individual
lawsuit-even one seeking nothing more than compensation for a
single private citizen-benefits the public as the compensatory
damages realized in such a case help deter wrongdoing by the
defendant. The lawyer in such a case might be labeled a private
attorney general under a very broad definition of the term, one that in
essence turns every private attorney into a private attorney general.68
Courts have been understandably wary of embracing this broad notion
of the private attorney general as it would authorize fee shifting in
every private lawsuit, the exception thereby swallowing the
traditional American rule that parties bear their own costs. Hence,
black letter law holds that "attorney's fees will not be awarded under
citizen suits in the environmental field seek deterrent prospective relief and are brought by
public interest groups subsisting on statutory fee shifting provisions. This occurs because citizen
suits do not all allow for compensatory damages. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act did not authorize citizen
suits for past damages). Congress has enacted provisions altering the outcome in Gwaltney by
permitting some citizen suits for civil penalties. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 707(g), 104 Stat. 2683; Daniel Riesel, Citizen Suits and the Award of
Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Litigation, in ENVIORNMENTAL LITIGATION 1073, 1114, 1126
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, June 20, 1994), WL C921 ALI-ABA 1073. Nonetheless,
Gwaltney's statement that "the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant
governmental action," Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added), remains a sensible
characterization of these provisions. See Thompson, supra, at 199-200 (discussing use of citizen
suits to fill enforcement gaps).
68. See Redish, supra note 36, at 90-91 (stating that individual compensatory lawsuits may
"be categorized as private attorney general actions, because they may well have the incidental
impact - perhaps even intended by the legislative creation of the private right - of exposing and
punishing law violations"); Rabkin, supra note 4, at 195 ("If the term is defined simply as one
who brings a lawsuit that may benefit third parties, then indeed almost any litigant might
qualify").
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the private attorney general doctrine where the interests of the
general public are only incidental to the primary objectives of the
parties of protecting their interests."6 9  This is the far end of the
spectrum because at this end, the private interest is large, not modest,
and the supplemental governmental work is incidental, not central.
Attorneys' fees doctrine polices this boundary between the private
attorney general and the mere private attorney.
Between these two extremes lies the core case: the class action
attorney who pursues representative litigation on behalf of a group of
private citizens. Unlike the environmental citizen suit plaintiff, this
private attorney general is not necessarily explicitly created by the
statute that supplies her substantive claims. Instead, her role is often
authorized by the class action rules enabling representative litigation
and by common law or statutory rules authorizing fee shifting when a
private attorney advances the public interest.70  Black's Law
69. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 256 (2004) (citing Cal. Licensed Foresters Ass'n. v.
State Bd. of Forestry, 30 Cal. App. 4th 562 (3d Dist. 1995)). It is true, as I discuss below, that
fees may be available in purely private situations, but such fees come from the class of private
beneficiaries according to a common fund theory, not by fee shifting according to this private
attorney general concept. See infra Part III.C.
70. This is not to suggest, as Professor Redish argues, that such suits are illegitimate. See
Redish, supra note 36, passim. Redish argues that Congress has not authorized the now-
common type of attorney-initiated small claims cases that do not yield significant individual
relief. Rather, he claims, Congress has been duped "by indirection and subterfuge." Id. at 73.
Redish is quite feverish on this point: he accuses the courts of acting "furtively" (four times), id.,
at 78, 116, 132, 138; "surreptitiously" (six times), id., at 114, 114-15, 115 n.47, 116, 136 n.194,
138; and by "disguise" (four times), id., at 81, 83-84, 84-85, 93. Yet court approvals of class
action settlements are public documents, widely available in case reports and on web sites,
relatively transparent, and far from unknown to Congress.
Forty years ago, when it approved the current version of Rule 23, Congress was exposed to
the idea that the rule could generate small claims cases unlikely to be initiated by private
plaintiffs nor to result in any significant compensation for class members. The federal class
certification rule explicitly requires courts to examine, "the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)(A). The clear implication of this inquiry is that there will be cases in which individuals
have scant interest in initiating or controlling the action, namely those cases where their
individual interest is minute, and that this is a factor that cuts in favor of class certification.
Lest this implication be lost on Congress, the Advisory Committee Notes emphasize the point,
stating:
The interest of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call
for denial of a class action. On the other hand, these interests may be theoretical rather
than practical; the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the
action through representatives would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at
stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (discussing 1966 amendment) (emphasis added).
Since 1966, Congress has rewritten the procedural rules for key areas of federal law in clear
reaction to-and hence with full knowledge of-the relationships between small claimants and
class action attorneys. In the securities field, Congress reacted to the absence of client control of
class actions by requiring that the largest intervening investor be presumptively appointed as
lead plaintiff. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 27(a)3(B)(iii), Pub. L. No.
2148
2004] PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2149
Dictionary defines the phrase "private attorney general" in these
terms:
The "private attorney general" concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is
entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorneys fees, if he has advanced
the policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of
persons.
7 1
The literature contains two competing visions of the
supplemental private attorney general. The oldest and most common
vision contends that private attorneys general are a necessary
supplement to government enforcement because government
attorneys lack certain attributes. 72 According to this account, private
attorneys general might be better at either discerning or pursuing
private wrongdoing, 73  or they may simply supplement public
enforcement by increasing the intensity of the penalty wrongdoers
must pay. 74 Private attorneys may be better at the first two functions
194-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified, inter alia, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z.1 to 78j-1 (2004)). In the antitrust
field, Congress reacted to the absence of client control and compensation by creating power in
state attorneys general to pursue compensatory parens patraie actions on behalf of consumers.
See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HRSA") tit. III, § 301, Pub. L. No 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, (codified at
15 U.S.C. §15c (2004)). While Congress's reaction to the problem in each area was distinct, what
is common and indisputable is Congress's appreciation that small claims class actions are not
generally initiated by individual claimants and do not generally result in compensation for them.
Yet in neither instance did Congress attempt to preclude the filing or settling of such cases.
Moreover, on numerous occasions in the past decade, members of Congress have introduced
legislation and Congress has held hearings reacting to precisely the state of affairs Redish
characterizes as "furtive." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 108-123, at 16 (2003) ("The common theme is the
same: the lawyers get the cash, while the plaintiffs get coupons or less."); S. REP. No. 106-420, at
8 (2000) ('Judges too readily approve settlements that primarily benefit the class counsel, not
the class members who they supposedly represent."). Nonetheless, Congress only recently
enacted the Class Action Fairness Act advocated in these reports, a law that will severely curtail
the use of coupon settlement.
In sum, Congress has authorized causes of action for small consumer, securities, and
antitrust violations knowing full well these were small claims, it has authorized representative
and other forms of litigation to vindicate these rights, and it has authorized fee shifting for
attorneys who successfully bring these cases.
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990) (subdefinition of "Attorney General")
(quoting Dasher v. Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 64 F.R.D. 722, 729 (N.D. Ga. 1974)).
72. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l. Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("The
aggregation of individual claims in ... a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of the government."); FLEMING JAMES
JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 643-44 (5th ed. 2001) ("The rise of the class action starting in the
1960s reflected the ... view that government agencies cannot adequately enforce certain
rights...")
73. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) ("When the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that
the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
compliance with the law.").
74. Professor Yeazell uses this language in his recitation of the conventional argument for
the class suit:
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for a variety of reasons-because public attorneys may be fewer in
number, underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures.7 5
This original version of the supplemental attorney general embodies a
weak public/strong private vision.
Some accounts of current class action practice supply a
competing vision of the supplemental attorney general. According to
these commentators, many, if not most, securities and antitrust class
actions are "piggyback" cases brought only on the heels of a
government enforcement action.76  As Professor Coffee has
demonstrated, plaintiffs' attorneys are risk averse entrepreneurs,
attempting to maintain diversified portfolios of case investments. 77
For such businesspeople, 78 cases that government attorneys have
already deemed relatively meritorious are attractive investments. It
is likely the government has undertaken significant investigation
before pursuing its action. The private attorney can free-ride on these
efforts, reaping the benefits of the government's factual investigation
[Kalven and Rosenfield] envisioned representative litigation as a supplement to
governmental regulation of large, diffuse markets like those in securities. They
argued that recent regulation of such markets reflected a consensus that the old,
ordinary forms of liability were not functioning to discipline their operations .... In
their view the representative suit would serve to supplement regulatory agencies both
by requiring wrong-doers to give up their ill-gotten gains and by ferreting out
instances of wrong that might have escaped the regulators' observance.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 232
(1987) (emphasis added).
75. On the differing incentives of public and private lawyers, see Coffee, supra note 36, at
225-28 & n.28; Warren F. Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68
GEO. L.J. 1075, 1093 (1980) (arguing that public enforcement may not be optimal because the
legislature will shape the prosecutor's case selection and because the prosecutor's behavior will
be "influenced by the available opportunities for advancement within the bureaucracy and the
impact of his behavior on his career if he leaves the government"); Thompson, supra note 67, at
189-92 (discussing limitations on public enforcement in the environmental field).
76. Professor Coffee first began sketching this account more than twenty years ago. John
C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 435-36 (1981); Coffee, supra note 36, at 220-23; see
also Garth et al., supra note 7, at 376 (stating empirical conclusion that "private attorneys
tended to 'piggyback' their cases on governmental investigations, even to the extent of copying
the government's complaint").
77. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 36, at 230-36, 280-84 ("[T]he lawyer as a bounty hunter has
reason to be more risk adverse than the client he represents .... "); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 704-712
(1986) ("[P]ortfolio diversification is a strategy that permits a plaintiffs attorney ... to reduce
the variance associated with an expected return.").
78. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (Summer 1985) ("[T]he plaintiffs attorney [is] a




and reducing her own investment in expensive fact discovery. 79 Better
still, nonmutual offensive issue preclusion provides a cheap and
simple way to take advantage of any issues litigated and determined
against the defendant.80 Such coattail class actions present a vision of
the supplemental attorney general that is a strong public/weak
private vision. The only supplemental function performed by this
private attorney general is that of multiplying wrongdoers' penalties:
she provides no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy,
and no nonpoliticized incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the
tab.8 1
The strong public/weak private vision has received significant
attention in the law review literature in recent years, but empirical
evidence demonstrating that this is the prevalent model is decidedly
mixed.8 2 On the one hand, class action filings in the securities field,
for example, barely exceed the number of SEC enforcement actions,
suggesting that private lawyers are not, in fact, supplementing public
enforcement by independently ferreting out and pursuing cases.83 On
the other hand, the SEC itself has "repeatedly acknowledged. . . that
private litigation enables a level of compliance that would be
impossible to achieve if enforcement were limited to the
government."8' 4 Moreover, public attorneys general and large savvy
plaintiffs hire private class action attorneys to represent them in
important cases. Public attorneys general do so, as noted, in high
79. See Coffee, supra note 77, at 682 (stating that entrepreneurial plaintiffs attorneys
"gravitate to those areas where search costs [for cases) are lowest"); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 641 (1986-1987) (same)
[hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action].
80. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (authorizing the use of
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in certain circumstances).
81. Coffee, supra note 36, at 223 (concluding that "the private attorney general does not
seem to broaden the scope of law enforcement, but rather only intensifies the penalty"). As
Professor Coffee points out, however, this piling on is far from insignificant-by contrast to the
limited penalties that public enforcers can exact, private damage remedies are often quite high
and hence an important adjunct to public proscription. Id. at 224 n.19.
82. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class
Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1997) (providing a careful assessment of enforcement in the
antitrust field).
83. The Stanford Law School Securities Class Actions Clearinghouse lists roughly 500 (493)
federal securities fraud class actions filed in 2001. See Stanford Law School, Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, at http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2005). Two
scholars report that the Securities and Exchange Commission pursued almost precisely the same
number (484) of actions that calendar year. James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, SEC
Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 749 (2003).
84. Fisch, supra note 36, at 199 (citing Securities Litigation Abuses: Testimony of Arthur
Levitt, Jr., Chairman of the Sec. and Exchange Comm'n Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997), available at 1997 WL
416650).
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profile matters like the tobacco and Microsoft cases; large investors do
so when such investors are made lead plaintiffs under federal
securities rules and given the authority to choose class counsel for the
investor class.8 5 These public choices of private counsel imply that
private attorneys general continue to provide litigation or negotiation
skills that supplement those of the public sector's attorneys general.
It may also be the case that private enforcement, even if weakened, is
important in that "the sheer diversity of enforcers should generate
more innovations than a monopolistic government enforcer would
produce."8 6
But the real limitation of the strong public/weak private
critique of the supplemental attorney general is that it focuses almost
exclusively in the areas of securities and antitrust (small claims) class
actions. In other fields, supplemental attorneys general continue to
play significant detection and pursuit functions. This is true of the
qui tam relator, for instance, who is authorized, in the first place,
precisely because it is believed that private parties (whistle blowers)
will be in a better situation to uncover fraud.8 7 But it is also true in
the broad field of environmental enforcement, where citizen groups
play an important monitoring function88 and where citizen suits, filed
often, are an important part of regulatory pursuit.8 9  And
85. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
409 (2001) (noting that "even after enactment of the PSLRA, the same exact plaintiffs' law firms
that so spurred Congress to act still appear to be representing securities classes") (citing Joseph
A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience,
1015 PLI/CORP. 955, 959, 976 (1997); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities
Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 549 (1997)).
86. Thompson, supra note 67, at 206; see also Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 49, at 721
(concluding that the best situation is to enable both administrative and class enforcement,
"permitting both to develop side by side to check and complement each other").
87. See Forney, supra note 58, at 1364 (stating that "[t]he idea behind [the False Claims
Act] was that individuals within the entity defrauding the government would have superior
knowledge of fraud over that of the Department of Justice") (citing U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing
Co., 9 F.3d 743, 745 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Fisch, supra note 36, at 196 ("Indeed, the
incentive structure of qui tam is tailored to place a premium on the contribution of original
information, with the intent that the unique access and insight of qui tam plaintiffs into the
operations of government contractors may enable them to identify instances of fraud that the
government would be unable to address on its own.").
88. Professor Thompson discusses the ways in which citizens play monitoring and
informant functions outside of doing so in citizen suits. Nonetheless, his article highlights how
much work citizen suits continue to do in the environmental context, as opposed to in the
securities or antitrust fields. Thompson, supra note 67, at 192-216.
89. In a dozen years (1981-1993), more than 2000 60-day notices, initiating citizen suits,
were filed under the Clean Water Act alone. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental
Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is
Shared By the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1573 (1995).
The government takes over these private environmental actions only on rare occasions. See
Thompson, supra note 67, at 200 n.74 (citing study showing that "out of 349 60-day notices, 11
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commentators have argued that private attorneys general continue to
play a key role in unearthing and pursuing mass torts. 90
The supplemental attorney general is situated in the middle of
the litigation spectrum. She is more distant from the public side than
the substitute attorney general, though not as close to the private
side, as we shall see, as the simulated attorney general. She mixes
public and private features in complex ways that, I will argue, both
exceed those noted by other commentators and have important policy
ramifications. Because she is clearly not paid for her services by a
government salary, it is tempting to see her compensation as private
in nature; yet she is generally not paid from her client's purse, either,
but rather by her adversary, according to fee-shifting rules that
provide her very title. Because she is clearly not representing the
government, it is tempting to see her client as her private class
members alone; yet her very position is justified on the grounds that
she pursues more than just her clients' private interests, but the
public interest as well. As she is clearly not a government
enforcement official, it is tempting to see her goal as compensation for
her clients; but again, in many of her cases each of her clients has so
little at stake that her pursuit of their scant interests is justified by
the deterrent impact of the class members' cumulative interest. 91
There are important policy ramifications of the supplemental
private attorney general's strikingly dual nature to which I will
were dropped because of government enforcement and 22 more resulted in government
enforcement with private regulation"). That said, "citizen suits are still swamped in magnitude
by state and federal enforcement actions," id. at 204, with the "vast majority" being Clean Water
Act cases. Id. Professor Thompson concludes that "citizen suits, in short, provide only a
marginal and circumscribed corrective value. But the value is not insignificant and may be quite
large in particular regions of the country where nonprofits have filed or threatened to file sizable
numbers of citizen suits." Id. Other commentators are less positive, seeing even environmental
suits as largely piggyback cases: "the kinds of violations most easily 'caught' by private advocacy
groups are statutory 'violations' which the EPA has already learned about - and the advocacy
groups then learn of them from EPA's own records." Rabkin, supra note 4, at 191.
90. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals From Private Attorneys General in Mega
Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001) (reporting that "[pirivate attorneys
general, not government regulators, discovered that Firestone Tires mounted on Ford Explorers
caused hundreds of rollover accidents due to tread separation.... The NHTSA [National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration] based its recall of 6.5 million tires on information
provided by plaintiffs counsel, rather than [by] in-house government investigators").
91. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 49, at 717 (concluding that "the class suit as a way
of redressing group wrongs is a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in private
practice"); Coffee, supra note 77, at 1355 (stating that in most small claims contexts,
"commentators largely have agreed that deterrence, not compensation, should be the rationale of
the class action, and they have doubted the compensation is likely to be achieved") (citing Reinier




return, below. First, though, it helps to situate these by filling out the
last part of the private attorney general spectrum.
C. The Private Attorney General as Simulated Attorney General for
Private Interests
Some private attorneys are awarded attorneys' fees on the
theory that their actions benefit a particular and specific class of
persons, not the public generally. This often occurs when an attorney,
in representing a single plaintiff, secures a fund that will benefit an
entire group of individuals, even if the case was not actually
prosecuted on behalf of the whole group or as a representative
action. 92 The private attorney is awarded fees out of the fund in these
situations on an unjust enrichment theory: if the other beneficiaries
are not made to contribute to the fees, they would be unfairly free-
riding. 93 Under this broad rationale, fee spreading is justified even if
the initial lawsuit does not recover an actual fund so long as there is
some means for spreading the costs among the group. Thus, the Court
applied the theory in a labor case, spreading the costs of an action
against a union among all of the benefited union members by taxing
fees against the defendant union, 94 and in a derivative case, spreading
the costs of the action among all of the benefiting shareholders by
taxing fees against the defendant corporation. 95 In this sense of the
term, the private attorney general is truly a private attorney
general-that is, an attorney general for a private group of plaintiffs,
not for the public interest generally.
I refer to this private attorney general as a simulated attorney
general since she is performing a function-recouping a fund for
private parties-not typically associated with a public attorney
92. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 124 (1884); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881). Occasionally, courts have gone so far as to say the
establishment of a legal precedent that directly benefits similarly-situated litigants can justify
spreading the costs of an action among the stare decisis beneficiaries, at least when their gain is
coming from a common source. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1938). See
generally 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D §
2675, at 322-323 (Supp. 2004) (discussing the "common fund doctrine").
93. See, e.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); id. at 396-97;
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967); Trustees, 105 U.S.
at 532 (1881).
94. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
95. Mills, 396 U.S. at 394. Justice Black dissented on the fee issue in Mills, arguing that "if
there is a need for recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the policies of the [Securities] Act here
involved, that need should in my judgment be met by Congress, not by this Court." Id. at 397
(Black, J., dissenting). In Alyeska Pipeline, a majority of the Justices adopted Justice Black's
position. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).
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general. She is not substituting for the attorney general, nor is she
generally rewarded because her actions contribute to a public good.
To be sure, the simulated attorney general bleeds into the
supplemental attorney general. This is evident in, for example,
securities cases like Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite.96 There the plaintiff in
a mixed derivative and securities class action secured an injunction
prohibiting the defendant corporation from voting proxies that had
been obtained by a misleading solicitation. While the Supreme Court
emphasized that the group should pay since the group members
derived a benefit,97 commentators classify the case among those
awarding fees to supplemental attorneys general because a
"legislatively expressed policy was found to be furthered by the
lawsuit."9 8 In the purer common fund cases, however, the simulated
attorney general is conceptualized as performing a function for a
group of ascertainable private parties alone, acting as a sort of
attorney general for these private parties.9 9 There is little confusion
about her goals (they are purely private in nature), her clients
(usually one private individual member of the private group), or the
private nature of her fee. The question is not whether she will be
compensated by the public fisc, the opponent, or a private party: the
question her fee poses is only whether it will be paid by one private
party alone or by the many private parties that benefited from her
actions.
The simulated private attorney general is the first step on the
spectrum away from the private attorney, but this step is a smaller
one than the substitute private attorney general presents from the
public side. Unlike the latter, who mixes public and private features,
the simulated attorney general is a purer character, more private than
D. Mapping The Mixes
Together, these three characters-the substitute attorney
general, supplemental attorney general, and simulated attorney
general-provide the midpoints on the public/private spectrum of
96. Mills, 396 U.S. at 377-96.
97. Id. at 396-97.
98. See 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 92, at 329-30 & n.29 (collecting cases).
99. In fact, to return to the derivation of the phrase attorney general-a lawyer with general
powers of attorney, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text-the common fund lawyer is




lawyering. We can now return to our visual mapping and fill in these
points:
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
I2 3 4 5
PRIVATE SIMULATED SUPPLEMENTAL SUBSTITUTE PUBLIC
individuals &
CLIENT individual individual public the public the public
FEE hourly or hourly or hourly/lodestar hourly/lodestar
or or
contingent contingent contingent contingent government salary
compensation
GOAL compensation compensation compensation & & deterrence
(deterrence) deterrence deterrence (compensation)
small claims
Greenough (securities, tobaccotort or Pettus antitrust) Microsoft
EXAMPLE contract Sprague & qui tam civil enforcement
mass tort
environment
E. Mapping The Margins
While I place three distinct types of private attorneys general
between the public and private attorneys, the middle type--the
supplemental attorney general, the conventional class action
attorney-is sealed into her position by doctrinal boundaries from
each side. 100
On the public side, the distinction between the substitute
attorney general and the supplemental attorney general is defined by
the notion of standing. The substitute attorney general, though a
private attorney, directly represents the government's interest. The
supplemental attorney general pursues public policies, but she does so
incidentally to her pursuit of her clients' private interests. Where
Congress has attempted to authorize private citizens to directly
enforce public policies, the Supreme Court has resisted by insisting
that a private citizen can only do so if she herself has an injury-in-fact
100. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court has recently tightened both of these
boundaries-standing and attorneys' fees-hence making private attorney general litigation
more difficult to maintain).
[Vol. 57:6:21292156
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
sufficient to satisfy standing requirements. 10 1 Such holdings have
limited the environmental citizen-suit plaintiff to articulate injury as
a precondition for enforcing Congress's laws. 10 2 The sole exception to
this is the qui tam relator, whom the Court has permitted to represent
the government directly. The Court has done so through the hedge of
the fact that the relator secures a bounty and thereby has an arguably
independent interest in the lawsuit. 10 3 I place the qui tam relator on
the substitute side of the line, though, because the real party in
interest is truly the government, and her bounty is a percentage of the
government's recovery. Scholars have suggested that Congress could
similarly end-run the standing requirements in environmental citizen-
suits by authorizing bounties for prevailing plaintiffs-hence giving
them an independent interest in the suit' 04-but to date Congress has
not done so. Standing remains the distinction between those who
represent the government directly and those who do so (supposedly)
only incidentally to the pursuit of their own interests. Standing
appears to leave no place for the altruist. In Part IV, below, I return
to this distinction.
On the private side, the distinction between the simulated
attorney general and the supplemental attorney general is defined by
the doctrine of attorney's fees. The simulated attorney general
represents only private interests and recovers fees, if at all, only from
those whom she assists. The supplemental attorney general
represents public and private interests; her pursuit of the former
authorizes courts to require that the losing party pay her fees in
recognition of the contribution her efforts have made to furthering
public policy. Because every case could conceivably be said to further
public ends, courts have struggled in setting the limits for fee-shifting
in private attorney general matters. They have largely done so by
insisting that the public gain be more than minimal and more than
incidental. The spectrum captures the distinction better than a bright
101. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that the
"irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" requires that the plaintiff suffer an "injury in
fact").
102. See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 931, 941-42
(1998); Sunstein, supra note 23, passim.
103. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74 (1999)
(discussing how a qui tam relator's bounty acts to confer standing upon him despite the fact that
the actual injury was suffered by the United States).
104. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 23, at 232 (positing that "bounty should create an interest
and hence standing"). See also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:
Deputizing Private Citizens in Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000)
(arguing for same concept in the civil rights field).
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line, but, if line it be, it is the one between boxes 2 and 3 on my
typology.
F. A Note on The Ideological/Entrepreneurial Distinction
Earlier I noted that to the extent other scholars have
attempted to organize the private attorney general concept, they have
relied on the single organizing principle of distinguishing the
ideologically-driven private attorney general (the NAACP lawyer)
from the money-driven private attorney general (the entrepreneur). 10 5
My spectral typology does not rely upon this incentive-based
distinction but rather maps the private attorneys general according to
the relative amounts of public- and privateness they contain. The
ideological/money distinction cuts across all of my categories. Thus,
there are both ideologues and entrepreneurs in all three of my
categories:
Two examples of ideological substitute attorneys
general are whistleblowers driven by principle as much
as by the qui tam bounty, and private attorneys like
David Boies pursuing Microsoft out of conviction as
much as for monetary gain (one guesses he did not
need whatever the Justice Department paid him). The
qui tam lawyer pursuing a government case for a
bounty is an entrepreneurial substitute attorney
general.
* The NAACP attorney pursuing individual client
interests but thereby furthering public values is the
familiar ideological supplemental attorney general. But
the big entrepreneurial class action firms so familiar
on the current adjudicative landscape are also
supplemental attorneys general; they pursue private
securities, antitrust, or consumer cases for their own
financial rewards, but thereby supplement
enforcement of these public norms.
* Lawyers who pursue democratic union rules, and
whose fees are then shared among all the union
members who benefited thereby, 10 6 present an example
105. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
106. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973).
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of an ideological simulated attorney general. The
private attorney who secures a bond ruling, then takes
a fee from the resulting fund, is an example of an
entrepreneurial simulated private attorney.
As I stated above, 10 7  I am not arguing that the
ideological/entrepreneurial distinction is without value. What I am
arguing is that there are lessons to be learned from a new
presentation of the field.
IV. ONE APPLICATION OF THE TYPOLOGY
While arraying the various private attorneys general along the
spectrum of distinct public-private mixes they present is itself a
contribution to the literature, the effort provides even more value if it
can illuminate troubling aspects of the field. In this section I argue
that it does just that. I do so by focusing on one case study-the
California consumer antitrust class action against Microsoft. I use the
Microsoft case because it is widely-publicized, and more importantly,
because it is a stellar example of a current- class action hotspot: the
coupon or voucher settlement.108 As such, the Microsoft case enables a
discussion of a central critique of nonpecuniary settlements: that in
agreeing to such settlements, private attorneys general sell out their
clients' interests for their own personal gain.
A. The Microsoft Case
On the heels of the Justice Department's pursuit of Microsoft
for antitrust violations, class action attorneys filed cases on behalf of
private consumers of Microsoft products in state courts throughout the
country. 10 9 In California, plaintiffs' attorneys and Microsoft reached a
107. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
108. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002) (discussing coupon-
based settlements and noting the disadvantages of such settlements to class members); Geoffrey
P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
97 (1997) (discussing coupon settlements as an example of nonpecuniary class action
settlements); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810 (1996) (discussing
in-kind payments in general). While the voucher settlement seems of recent vintage, in fact
Professor Coffee noted the development-and the ways it skews class action dynamics-more
than two decades ago. Coffee, supra note 36, at 243-246; Coffee, supra note 77, at 716 & n.129.
109. The original California action was filed before Judge Jackson's ruling in the Justice
Department's prosecution. Following that ruling, however, dozens of individual lawsuits were
filed throughout California, "piggybacking' on the government's litigation success. These private
consumer class actions define their classes so as to exclude, explicitly, government entities, even
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$1.1 billion voucher settlement on the eve of a February 2003 trial
date. About fourteen million consumers and businesses that acquired
certain Microsoft products between 1995 and 2001 for use in
California can claim vouchers by filling out a claim form. Following
approval of the settlement, vouchers will be mailed to class members
who have claimed them. They can then redeem their vouchers if,
during the next four years, they purchase any computer hardware or
software and mail proof of their purchase with the voucher to the
Claims Administrator. The vouchers themselves are for small
amounts of money, ranging from $5 vouchers for Microsoft Word
purchasers, through $16 vouchers for Windows or DOS operating
system purchasers and $26 vouchers for Excel purchasers, to $29
vouchers for Office suite purchasers.
The settling attorneys for each side were well aware that
nowhere near $1.1 billion is likely to be claimed $20 at a time (that
would amount to fifty-five million $20 vouchers claimed, secured,
used, and redeemed). In such small-claims matters, the left-over fund
can later be distributed pro rata among those class members who have
filed claims, 10 can revert to the defendants,"' or can be deployed
towards some other end according to a cy pres approach." 2 The
where those entities are computer consumers. Public entities are left to their own litigation
efforts to recover for antitrust-related overcharges on their computer purchases. Michael
Bazeley, California Counties Accuse Microsoft of Inflating Prices for Products, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2004, available at 2004 WL 59250916.
110. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrance, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer
Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 765 (1988).
111. See, e.g., Hailyn Chen, Comment, Attorneys Fees in Reversionary Fund Settlements in
Small Claims Consumer Class Actions, 50 UCLA L. REV. 879, 880 n.1 (2003).
112. See, e.g., 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.20, at
11-26 to 11-29 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the cy pres doctrine); Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The
Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 731-32 (1987) (commenting on the use of the cy pres doctrine to distribute
unused portions of class action settlement funds); see also infra text accompanying note 129
(documenting the origins of the cy pres doctrine). Cy pres-like redistribution occurs in the
environmental field as well:
[A] widespread practice arose in the 1980s of [citizen suit lawyers] negotiating
settlements in which firms agreed to devote funds to environmental improvements,
while the plaintiff agreed not to pursue the suit toward final judgment (and the
ensuring payment of a full fine to the Treasury). The firms then made the payments
not directly to the particular litigating organization but to some environmental project
in the area - often one conducted by a sympathetic local or allied advocacy group. The
firm has no incentive to be fussy about recipients (so long as the total cost is less than
the potential fine), nor does the plaintiff have much incentive to focus the relief on the
precise injury (supposing there was one) that provoked the lawsuit.
Rabkin, supra note 4, at 191. Scholars have debated the value of these types of redistributions.
Some argue that they are preferable to civil fines that simply go unearmarked into the federal
treasury. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 67, at 207-09 (discussing, inter alia, David A. Dana,
The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case of Supplemental
Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1183). Others emphasize that redistributions
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California Microsoft settlement adopted this last option: if the total
amount of vouchers claimed and redeemed by class members is less
than $1.1 billion, vouchers amounting to two-thirds of the money
remaining in the fund will be distributed to underprivileged public
schools throughout California. 113
Plaintiffs' lead counsel has requested $97 million in fees and
costs for itself and another $197 million for thirty-four other firms
that worked on the case. This is about 27 percent of $1.1 billion, but
as it is highly likely that less than the full fund will actually be
distributed, the attorneys' recovery will be an even greater percentage
of the fund.'1 4 Notice of this settlement was distributed to the class,
and about 170 objections were lodged. Despite these protests, the
California Superior Court approved the settlement in July 2004.
A significant number of the objectors to the class settlement
labeled the cy pres aspect of the settlement to be theft. From their
perspective, the damages Microsoft is willing to pay are the property
of the consumers who purchased Microsoft products-namely, the
class members. By the cy pres settlement, class counsel has agreed to
a deal that takes these private parties' property and redistributes it to
public school children throughout California.
B. The Private Critique
While the supplemental private attorney general has her
origins in the image of civil rights lawyers like Thurgood Marshall, 1 5
in the past twenty years, scholars loosely associated with the law and
economics movement-most centrally, Professor John Coffee--have
might skew sensible environmental enforcement patterns. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 191
(discussing, inter alia, Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65
TuL. L. REV. 339 (1991)). Regardless of the value of these redistributions, my point is simply to
note the utilization of a cy pres like approach in a distinct regulatory field.
113. Eligible schools are defined as those that have at least 40 percent of their students from
low-income households. See Settlement Agreement, at 5, In re Microsoft Cases, J.C.C.P No..
4106 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2003), available at http://www.microsoftcalsettlement.comPDF/
SettlementAgreement.pdf.
114. To be clear, however, the attorneys' fee petition is based on a lodestar calculation, not a
percentage of the fund method and it will not come out of the $1.1 billion fund but will be paid in
addition to the voucher distributions.
115. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Civil Rights Movement and the Silent Litigation Revolution,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2004). At the time of the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, class action
attorneys were largely, though not entirely, understood as a welcome but small band of
ideological crusaders. Those who profited by this endeavor were largely seen as the exception to
the NAACP conceptualization.
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sketched a competing portrayal of class counsel. 116 Professor Coffee's
class action attorney is first and foremost a private entrepreneur,
spurred by a profit-based motive to pursue litigation that may or may
not be in the public interest. To understand the class action attorney,
Professor Coffee argued that scholars need to focus on his private,
rent-seeking incentives rather than his presumed public spirit.
Once he had re-focused the field, Professor Coffee
demonstrated that the problem presented by entrepreneurial
lawyering can be understood in terms of agency costs. 117 In traditional
litigation, the attorney is an agent for her client. Translated to the
class case, private law scholars view the attorney as the agent of the
class members she purports to represent."18 But in most class actions,
class members have so little at stake, and/or lack such information
and expertise, that they do not have the incentive or capacity to
monitor their agents." 9 Hence, class actions are characterized by a
116. Professor Coffee has produced his description in a series of articles spanning several
decades. See generally Coffee, supra note 36, passim; Coffee, supra note 78, passim; Coffee,
Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 79, passim; Coffee, supra note 77, passim; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entreprenurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, passim (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation of
Entreprenurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation after Amchem
Products - or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1541, passim (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, passim (2000)
[hereinafter Coffee, Class Action Accountability]. Professor Rosenberg contemporaneously drew
a similar portrayal of the class action lawyer in the mass tort field. See David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice By Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 571-72
(1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts]; David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
849, 889-92, 900-04 (1984) [hereinafter Rosenberg, The Causal Connection]. While both
Professors Coffee and Rosenberg were influenced by theoretical law and economics scholarship
focusing on attorney incentives (for a good overview and introduction to this literature, see
ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003)), the sketches
they developed in their scholarship were based more on what lawyers did in practice than on
theoretical models of what would be rational for them to do in the abstract.
117. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 76 (stating that the "proper focus should be on the
interests of the client and the classic problems that arise when the client, as principal, cannot
closely control the attorney, his agent"). See generally Kenneth E. Scott, Agency Costs and
Corporate Governance, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 26
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("Agency cost theory deals with the inevitable divergence of self
interest between principal and agent, owner and manager, or employer and employee, the
welfare losses thereby created, and the devices and institutions that have evolved to reduce those
losses.").
118. Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 116, at 379-80 (stating that "underlying
the class action is a principal/agent relationship between the attorney and the individual class
members").
119. See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 79, at 628 ("High agency costs
characterize class action litigation, and permit opportunistic behavior by attorneys; as a result, it
is more accurate as a descriptive matter to view the attorney as an independent entrepreneur
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rent-seeking entrepreneur pursuing her own interests with little
oversight by her principals. 120 Professor Coffee specifically, and law
and economics scholars more generally, proposed rules that sought to
reduce agency costs by "better align[ing] the interests of the plaintiffs
attorney" with those of the class members she represented. 121
So convincing was this solution that it became a virtual mantra
of the class action literature in the 1990s. Scholars from various
political viewpoints, who employ many methodologies beyond law and
economics and who otherwise agree about very little, could all agree
that the central problem in class action jurisprudence was the agency
dilemma. Where the scholars differed, however, were in their
proposed solutions. Some thought market-type mechanisms could
produce alignment. 122 Others, like those that proposed the PSLRA,
than as an agent of the client."); Coffee, Regulation of Entreprenurial Litigation, supra note 116,
at 882-96 (same).
120. See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 116, at 376 ("[The class action is
essentially an organizational form that at bottom involves a principal/agent relationship. From
this starting point, it follows that the class members, as the principals, should be deemed to have
consented to the representation only if the agency costs associated with the relationship have
been minimized.").
121. Coffee, supra note 78, at 12; see also id. at 33 (stating that "[a]n obvious policy
prescription would be to compensate the plaintiffs attorney in a manner that better aligns his
interests with those of his involuntary clients, the shareholders"); Coffee, supra note 77, at 726
("[T]he basic goal of reform should be to reduce the agency costs incident to this attorney-client
relationship. while various means to this end are possible.., all should be understood as
responses to this agency cost problem and debated in that light."); Coffee, Class Action
Accountability, supra note 116, at 371 ("[M]eaningful reform requires that we consider market-
based remedies and checking mechanisms that have worked in related contexts to align the
interests of the principal and the agent.").
Some commentators argue not for alignment of interests, but for doing away with the
principals altogether by auctioning off their causes of action to the highest bidding plaintiffs'
attorney. Professor Coffee first proposed this auction concept. See Coffee, supra note 36, at 277
n.142 ("An economist might suggest that the case should be auctioned off among the plaintiffs'
attorneys by having them bid in terms of the lowest attorneys' fee that they would accept.");
Coffee, supra note 78, at 77-79 (discussing possibilities not just of auctioning plaintiffs' causes of
actions, but also of auctioning rights of representation in specific cases or in a specific type of
case through franchise arrangement); Coffee, supra note 77, at 691-93 (same). Professors Macey
and Miller then provided a sustained investigation of it. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: An Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). See also Jean Wegman
Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 165 (1990) (arguing that class counsel should represent the class without the useless class
representative intermediary); Fisch, supra note 36, at 182-83 (discussing the possibility of
removing the client altogether).
122. Professor Coffee, for example, proposed loosening ethical rules so plaintiffs' attorneys
could share fees across cases. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 65-69. Coffee argued that by
"permitting fee sharing (within limits), one actually makes the lawyer a better servant of the
client by reducing his dependence on a single case, thereby decreasing his level of likely risk
aversion and dampening the incentives for early settlement." Id. at 67. Elsewhere, he proposed a
set of rule-based incentives that would induce "attorneys to mimic the results that a healthy,
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imagined that stronger principals were the best mechanism by which
to ensure that agents served their clients' interests. 123 Others wanted
class action courts to play a more active role in ensuring this
alignment, perhaps through the appointment of a guardian ad
litem. 24 Still others saw opt-outs as the key to aligning the agents'
interests with those of the class.' 25 Although commentators could not
agree on a cure, they were in accord regarding the diagnosis-the
virus infecting the class action system was the principal-agent
problem and the solution was to align the interests of the class with
those of its agent.126
The Microsoft cy pres settlement in some ways exemplifies the
precise problem identified by the agency-costs scholarship: 27 here
unmonitored class attorneys have taken their clients' compensatory
functioning market for legal services would produce." Coffee, Regulation of Entreprenurial
Litigation, supra note 116, at 878. And in mass tort cases, he argued for enabling competing
class actions and permitting clients to opt into the one that best suited them, thus creating a
market of opportunities for class members. See Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note
116, at 422-28; 436-7 (stating that "[t]he deeper premise here is that the best remedy for
collusion is competition").
123. As with the auction concept, supra note 121, Professor Coffee was the first to propose
this large-client monitor approach. See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 79, at
643-44 ("[I]f agency costs are to be reduced, the most effective monitor is likely to be the plaintiff
who has the largest stake in the action."); Coffee, Regulation of Entreprenurial Litigation, supra
note 116, at 894-96 & n.35 (same). Professors Weiss and Beckerman then provided a sustained
investigation of it. Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053 (1995).
124. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1092 (1995) ('[O]rdinarily' a guardian would be
required.").
125. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement:
Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1206 (1998) ("Even if the
defendant wants to maintain the agreement and deal with the opt outs separately, a high
number of opt outs may be grounds for the court to conclude that the settlement is insufficient or
to doubt representative adequacy.").
126. Professor Rosenberg was something of an exception in that he focused his attention on
defending the mass processes of class action cases because of their deterrent effects, rather than
on seeking a way to maximize compensation by better aligning the interests of the plaintiffs and
their counsel. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts and Rosenberg, The Causal Connection,
supra note 116, passim.
127. The Microsoft cases represent the fear that class attorneys will sell out their clients'
claims. The other prong of the agency cost attack on class action is the strike suit-the fear that
attorneys will overlitigate, not undersell. Rubenstein, supra note 85, at 397 n.120; see also Bruce
L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2000). Given the government's successful
pursuit of Microsoft, these private coattail antitrust actions cannot be characterized as strike
suits. They are also not perfect sell out cases in that the lawyers arguably sold out the clients
here not just for their own fees, but for the benefit of a lot of school children as well.
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damages and given them to schools throughout California. 128 While at
first blush, the cy pres shocks proponents of a private model, at second
blush, cy pres invokes a doctrine from the world of private (usually
charitable) trusts and estates: when a testator's specific instructions
can no longer be pursued, a court may redirect the trust's benefits to
something "as close as possible" (cy pres) to the testators' original
desires. 129 As applied to the Microsoft settlement, the cy pres concept
implies that redistributing their monies to the public schools comes
"as close as possible" to fulfilling the nonclaiming class members'
desires. 130 But, the private model inquires, how do the agents know
this of their principals? 131 The very fact that California provides
128. It should be noted that it could be worse: some settlements in small claims cases have
accorded 100 percent of the settlement to the cy pres distribution, leaving class members not
even an opportunity to claim their small compensation. Such a procedure occurs most frequently
in parens patriae actions brought by state governments. See Susan B. Farmer, More Lessons
from the Laboratories: Cy pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought By
State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 399-403 (1999) ("Distributions ... do not go
directly to the injured citizens represented by the state as parens partiae, but to a public purpose
designed to benefit those consumers indirectly."). By contrast, the Microsoft case enables any
class member who so desires to come forward and claim her vouchers, redirecting a fraction of
only that portion of the settlement left unclaimed. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the
settlement will redirect to the schools the vast bulk of the compensatory damages due to the
plaintiff class members.
129. According to one commentator:
The term "cy pres" appears to derive from the Norman-French term "cy pres comme
possible," meaning "as near as possible." Cy pres is a rule of construction which courts
employ to carry out the spirit of a trust's terms when literal application of such terms
is not feasible. Rather than have a trust fail and the trust's assets revert back to the
testator's successors in interest, courts apply the trust's funds "cy pres" or "as near as
possible," so that benefits from the trust may continue and the testator's intent may
be approximately honored.
Matthew Perkins, Note, The Cy pres Doctrine in the 1980s: The Case For Charitable Favoritism,
10 PROB. L. J. 163, 165 (1990). See generally, Farmer, supra note 128, at 391-406 (analyzing the
use of the "cy pres" concept in class action law); Patricia Sturdevant, Using the Cy Pres Doctrine
to Fund Consumer Advocacy, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 80.
130. Professor Hazard has noted how attorneys general have historically supervised
charitable trusts. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1405. The private attorney general here could be
seen as performing a similar function with regard to the class members' monies. But in the
traditional case, the choice to establish the charitable trust came from a donor, not from
supervising attorney general herself.
131. Professor Coffee asks essentially this question in the analogous mass tort context
where, he argues, class attorneys in certain asbestos cases "simply waived compensation for most
class members with non-malignant conditions in return for cash payments to those class
members with serious malignant conditions." John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemna of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1398 (1995). Coffee reports that class
counsel attempted to justify this on the grounds that, ex ante, it is a preference rational class
members would have made. Id. Professor Coffee is not only skeptical of the empirical basis of
this claim; he also finds it ethically bankrupt: "Although a legislature or some politically
accountable body might decide to provide compensation to only the worst off on paternalistic
grounds, a private attorney, acting as class counsel, seemingly has no entitlement to abandon the
interests of one group of clients to benefit another." Id. (emphasis added). The cy pres settlement
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relatively little funding for its public schools 13 2 is good evidence that
the missing class members, more than thirteen million California
purchasers, 133 would prefer their money to be used in other ways. 3 4
And numerous other ways existed-the unused portion of the fund
could have been distributed among the claiming class members; 35 it
could have reverted to Microsoft, with the requirement that similar
products be discounted across the board until the settlement fund was
depleted; 36 or, the funds could have been distributed to retail stores
throughout the state with directions to provide cash rebates on
computer product purchases until the fund had been exhausted.
These alternatives might not be perfect. Yet any of them, and many
other distributive possibilities, would surely have been "pres-er"
(closer) to the class members' private interests than the school
distribution.
In sum, the Microsoft settlement sits uneasily within a purely
private model of adjudication. Rent-seeking plaintiffs' attorneys have
sold private individual rights to the defendants for a return that will
is, arguably, even more ethically troubling, in that the class attorney has abandoned-if
abandonment it be-the interests of one group of clients to benefit another group of people that
are not even clients.
132. According to the National Education Association's (NEA), California ranks twenty-ninth
among the fifty states in per student expenditures for public K-12 education. NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE STATES 2003 AND
ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2004 (2004), available at http://www.nea.org/edstats/images/
04rankings.pdf.
133. As of July 2004, about 600,000 of the 14 million class members had filed claims seeking
vouchers. Rachel Konrad, Microsoft, California Deal Gets Final OK; Judge Dismisses All
Objections, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 8, 2004, at 1C (citing lead attorney's statement).
134. Perhaps the monies could be used to ensure that only English is spoken in public
schools (except by our Governor). See Ann. Cal. Educ. Code § 300 et eq. (West 1998) (providing
that only English can be spoken in public schools). The monies could also be used to ensure that
marriage remains the sole province of a man and a woman. See Ann. Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5
(West 2000) (codifying the proposition that marriage is solely between a man and a woman).
Both policies were-among many others-adopted by California voters at the ballot box in the
past decade,
135. Professor Coffee refers to this as the "obvious alternative" because the appearing class
members rarely "receive full compensation in any settlement." Coffee, supra note 131, at 1369
n.96. Other commentators, however, have expressed concern that the appearing class members
would receive not just full compensation, but a windfall. Farmer, supra note 128, at 393 (citing
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1977); Cal. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d
564, 573 (Cal. 1986)).
136. See Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d at 571 ("Under the price rollback approach, the
uncollected portion of the fund is distributed- through the market by lowering the price of the
defendant's product for a specified period."); Farmer, supra note 128, at 395 & n.232 ('The
options... include ordering the defendant to reduce future prices on its products until the total
lost profits equal the amount of unclaimed funds.") (citing In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
744 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir. 1984)). As Farmer notes, this solution is less than optimal,
particularly in an antitrust matter, both because it requires buyers to purchase the defendant's
products and because it thereby solidifies defendant's market share. Id.
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largely benefit public, not private, interests. The agents have secured
a memorable payday, while the principals receive little direct value.137
C. The Typology's Lesson
The private attorney general typology helps expose a weakness
in this principal/agent, or private, approach to class action
jurisprudence. This private conception depends upon identifying a
principal that the agent, the class action attorney, serves. Scholars
identify that principal as the members of the immediate class, a
seemingly logical assumption. 138 The immediate class members are,
after all, the class action attorneys' clients, those who provide the
causes of action giving rise to the case. The problem with this
characterization, however, is that it fully privatizes the class action
attorney, pushing her from the middle of the private attorney general
spectrum to the private side, conceptualizing her as solely an agent
serving the immediate interests of her particular clients. In my terms,
it mistakes the supplemental attorney general for a simulated
attorney general. The supplemental attorney general, unlike the
simulated attorney general, does not solely serve the interests of the
parties to a particular case. She also serves the public interest. The
class action literature of the past decade is so focused on how to align
137. Professor Coffee critiques cy pres settlements but in so doing he does not focus on the
Robin Hood aspects of these redistributions; Coffee's focus is instead on his contention that these
settlements are but a "recent variation" of class action collusion - that is, defendants buy res
judicata cheaply by paying the plaintiffs' attorneys a high, uncontested fee in exchange for a
lowball settlement. See Coffee, supra note 131, at 1367-1373.
138. The most significant debate in the literature about the nature of the principal in class
action cases concerns whether to treat the private individuals in the class as individuals or as a
collective private entity, like a corporation. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the
Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26-32 (1996) (analyzing the benefits of speaking of the
class as an entity); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 923-942 (1998) (same). Professor Coffee responded, defending the notion that
class members should be treated as individuals. Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note
116, at 379-380.
All of the participants in this debate promote purely private notions of the client; their
difference concerns the nature-individual or entity-of that private principal; none examine the
extent to which the public is, partially, the principal in certain class cases, as I do here.
Similarly, in his later work, Professor Coffee argues that the agent (the class attorney) is not a
pure fiduciary of the class, but also "the creditor and joint venturer." Coffee, Class Action
Accountability, supra note 116, at 418. This recharacterization of the agent has ramifications for
Professor Coffee's recommendations-it leads him to reconceptualize the principals as not just
passive wards but as active consumers, entitled to make market-like choices among creditors
and joint venturers. See id. at 436-37 ("The critical difference between the fiduciary-based
approach and the market-based approach is that.., the latter views the client as a consumer,
whose informed choice should both be expanded and respected."). However this new way of
thinking remains a purely private way of imagining both the agent and her principals.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:6:2129
the interests of the agent with that of the class that it
underemphasizes questions about who constitutes the relevant
class.139
If we reconceptualize the private attorneys general in the
Microsoft antitrust case as supplemental attorneys general, we
appreciate that they perform public as well as private functions.
Their clients are not just the class members, but the public and the
class members; their goal is not just compensation, but deterrence and
compensation. Their fee is paid neither by the government nor by the
plaintiffs, but rather by the defendants-in addition to the remedy
they have already exacted from the defendants for their clients.1 40
Thus the plaintiffs' counsel in the California Microsoft matter mixed
public and private functions in ways that are distinct from those of the
villain in the 1990s class action literature. To conclude, as that
literature did, that the goal of class rules should simply be to align the
interests of the agent with those of the class is to misconstrue the
nature of the private attorney general at issue in this type of class
action, and hence to mischaracterize the principal she serves.
If the supplemental private attorney general is an agent for a
public as well as a private principal-particularly in her deterrent
functions-then she can serve this agent in a variety of ways. One
way is surely to capture significant compensatory damages for the
139. Professor Coffee's work acknowledges the issue but does not dwell on its ramifications.
In two successive articles, he uses a graph that demonstrates that the most efficient private
settlement does not match the most efficient public settlement. Coffee, supra note 78; Coffee,
supra note 77, at 689. In an accompanying footnote he maps this problem onto the
compensation/deterrence distinction. Coffee, supra note 78, at 48 n.116 (' The derivative action
also can be analyzed in this light because, to the extent that shareholders are at least partially
diversified, they may benefit more from the deterrence generated than from the compensatory
recovery."). In a later article, Professor Coffee discusses the problem that emerges in public
interest litigation when one organization (say the NAACP) funds a lawsuit, while another set of
persons (the individual clients) in theory control it. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra
note 79, at 631 n.23. He states this problem as a question of "who is the principal-the named
plaintiffs or the organization?" and notes in passing that "client objectives should not always
control litigation decisions, even in the settlement context." Id. at 631-32 & n.23. See generally
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1676 (1997) (discussing different
models of decisionmaking that can be employed to define client objectives in group litigation).
But he puts this whole issue "beyond the scope" of his concerns. Coffee, Rethinking the Class
Action, supra note 79, at 631. My argument here is that the question Professor Coffee
marginalizes to civil rights cases--"who is the principal?"-is in fact quite present in noncivil
rights class actions as well. But other than acknowledging the problem in passing, Professor
Coffee and other scholars do not analyze its ramifications for the alignment thesis. Their
emphasis remains focused primarily, if not solely, on the private interests. See Coffee, supra
note 77, at 714 (stating that there are "three sets of interests involved in [class] actions: those of
the defendants, the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs attorneys," but not those of the public).
140. I appreciate that in practice, defendants figure this into the amount they are willing to
offer the class members, and adjust that amount accordingly.
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immediate class members that will then deter future conduct, thus
aligning the individual class members interests with the larger public
interest. But this is not the only way. The private attorney general's
fee itself, if sufficiently large, serves a deterrent function; in a small
claims case, the fee, even if a modest percentage of the class members'
damages, will typically dwarf the aggregate amount individual class
members will step forward to claim. The fee thus plays a significant
public function where compensatory damages will not. The cy pres
settlement, if significant, also serves a deterrent function, even if it
does not provide significant compensation for class members
themselves. Indeed, each of these alternatives does not put money
directly in the hands of the immediate clients, and in that sense the
interests of the attorneys negotiating for these types of settlements
are not perfectly aligned with the private interests of the immediate
class members. The attorneys' interests, however, might be aligned
with the public principal's interest in deterrence. Additionally, the
larger amorphous class for which the immediate class members are a
proxy (say consumers generally, as opposed to these particular
consumers; or shareholders generally, as opposed to those in this
particular class) might well benefit from settlements distinct from
those that narrowly serve the precise interests of the individual class
members. It is arguable that our goal in class jurisprudence should be
to align the interests of the agent with those of her public principal,
not just those of her private clients.
Once the proper private attorney general conceptualization is
applied, what is troubling is not that this agent is redistributing
private monies (such as the Microsoft consumers' monies) towards a
public goal (underserved schools)-after all, we empower her to serve
both private and public principals. Rather, what is beguiling is how to
fashion rules that strike a proper balance of the public and private
functions that constitute this supplemental attorney general. On the
one hand, were she serving only private ends (as a simulated attorney
general), it would be easy to demand that all monies go solely to the
class members. On the other hand, were she a public attorney
general, it would be easy to demand that a civil penalty find its way
into the public treasury. But if this supplemental private attorney
general wears two hats, it is more difficult to establish clear guidelines
for her actions.
Although the typology cannot provide perfect guidance, it does
illustrate several key aspects of the debate in new ways. First,
supplemental private attorneys are synchronic in nature. The dual
private/public lawyer presents the problem that is inevitably
presented by all things "bi": whether the duality is realized in a
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diachronic or synchronic manner.' 4 1 The diachronic bi performs her
dual nature one side at a time. Bisexuals, though attracted to both
men and women, tend (though not invariably) to have relationships
and/or sex with a man or a woman one at a time. Bipolar persons
alternate between periods of mania and depression. On the other
hand, the synchronic bi performs her dual nature at the same time.
Biracial persons are generally biracial at each and every moment,
synthesizing their dual heritage into a single synchronic performance.
The supplemental private attorney general is a synchronic concept-
we imagine these attorneys to be both public and private in nature at
the same time. Substitute private attorneys general may be private
one day, public the next, 142 but supplemental private attorneys
general simultaneously pursue both private and public goals. They
represent individual clients, to be sure, but their fee is shifted on the
theory that their case supplements public enforcement efforts. So
while engendered by a private client, the supplemental attorney
general is rewarded for her public contributions.
Second, though synchronically bi, supplemental attorneys
general are not all equally synchronic in their mix of public and
private functions. They are, as the typology shows, arrayed upon a
spectrum. What the spectrum demonstrates is that the relationship
between the private interest and the public interest varies. On the
more public side, the private interest may be quite minimal (that
required to satisfy the Supreme Court that the private attorney
general meets federal standing requirements) and the public payoff
quite significant (citizen suit plaintiffs can secure quite widespread
remedies). On the more private side, the private interest is
predominant (for example, damages in mass tort class actions) and the
public payoff more incidental (the deterrent effect of the cumulative
individual cases).
The private critics of small claims class actions incorrectly
situate these on the more private rather than the more public side of
this continuum. The law and economics scholars are correct that
there are private interests at stake in small-claims cases. But these
private, compensatory features are not the only aspects of the small-
claims class action-such cases also serve the public function of
deterring wrongdoing and thereby supplement governmental law
141. The terms "synchronic" and "diachronic" are borrowed from Robert M. Cover, The Uses
of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639
(1981).
142. For example, David Boies, a private attorney, becomes a private attorney general when
hired by the Justice Department to litigate the Microsoft matter; however once he is operating as
a private attorney general, he embodies and performs the duality synchronically.
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enforcement. These cases contain private facets, to be sure, but they
can be situated at the more public end of my spectrum. The small-
claims plaintiff is much more similar to the plaintiff in an
environmental citizen-suit than she is to a plaintiff in a mass tort
case. Her minute personal interests enable the lawsuit, but they do
not necessarily define the contours of the remedies that should be
sought. Once standing, even on her scant private platform, the
citizen-suit plaintiff can vindicate public policies quite broadly.
In sum, the law and economics literature focused attention on
plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives and argued that the attorneys'
incentives should be aligned with those of the immediate class
member/principals that she represented. The typology I present here,
approaching the issue from a different perspective, demonstrates that
the supplemental private attorney general does not have one simple,
private, principal. Supplemental attorneys general serve both private
and public purposes; they tend to need a private client with standing
to do so, but this private client's particular interest may not be their
raison d'etre and this private client's interests may pale in comparison
to the public function they are performing. Rather than align this
agent's interest with those of the class, perhaps the goal should be to
align this agent's interest with those of her larger public principal as
well, or instead of, those of the class.
This is one application that demonstrates the utility of the
spectral typology I present here.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars and judges have regularly utilized the private
attorney general concept in a variety of contexts for nearly a quarter-
century. So prevalent is the use of this term that its meaning has
become somewhat vague and undifferentiated. My hope is that this
Article will make the field somewhat less vague and more
differentiated. In particular, I have highlighted four key aspects of
the private attorney general concept.
First, private attorneys general are persons who mix public
and private functions in the adjudicative arena, but they do so in a
variety of ways that can best be understood when mapped onto a
spectrum. Private attorneys general occupy the middle portion of a
lawyering spectrum that runs from private lawyering on one side to
public lawyering on the other.
Second, within this middle, three distinct types of
public/private mixes are presently identifiable-those I label
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substitute attorneys general, supplemental attorneys general, and
simulated attorneys general.
Third, two sets of legal doctrines-standing and attorneys'
fees-police the margins between private attorneys general and
regular attorneys. Standing doctrine polices the boundary between
public attorneys and private attorneys general: the former represent
the public interest by job description; the latter are permitted, in
federal court, to represent the public interest only when they have
some private stake of their own in the matter. Attorneys' fees doctrine
polices the boundary between private attorneys and private attorneys
general. The former represent only private clients and are paid only
by them; the latter perform a function that exceeds pure private
representation and are therefore entitled to some different type of fee
arrangement.
Fourth, supplemental private attorneys general are
synchronically so-performing public and private functions at the
same time, not episodically. However, the quantities of public and
private presented in the synchronic mix can vary. Some supplemental
attorneys general perform significant public functions with only scant
private interests at stake (such as environmental citizen-suit
plaintiffs) while others perform incidental public functions with
significant private interests at stake (such as mass tort class action
plaintiffs).
More than a half century ago, Alfred Kinsey relieved us of the
sense that sexuality comes in two pure forms, demonstrating instead
that our sexual lives can be arranged across a spectrum of mixes. He
was, of course, correct, and yet only faint traces of this lesson are
imprinted on our public consciousness. Occasionally, we pay
intellectual lip service to Kinsey's spectrum, but our minds and our
public discourse continue to sort individuals into but two boxes. I
suspect some of the reason we do so is that where a person may fall on
the Kinsey spectrum-the degree of mixes she embodies-is of so
seemingly little import. Kinsey had insisted that "[i]t is imperative
that one understand the relative amounts of the heterosexual and
homosexual in an individual's history if one is to make any significant
analysis of him."143 But we don't believe it-the relative amounts of
the heterosexual and homosexual in an individual's history may tell
us very little of his practices and even less about his character.
By contrast, my argument here is that it really is imperative
that we know the relative measure of the public and private embodied
in particular private attorneys general. The legal system can neither
143 KINSEY ET AL, supra note 15, at 647.
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be sure what to expect nor certain what to demand from a private
attorney general in a given situation without knowing the contours of
that person's public/private mix. How much a particular type of
private attorney general is thought to be'an agent for public ends, in
addition to private ones, critically affects the rules by which we should
enable (and constrain) her and the fees with which we should reward
her. The precision with which we define the private attorney general
concept matters.

